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ABSTRACT
Traffic classification and distinction allows network opera-
tors to provision resources, enforce trust, control unwanted
traffic, and traceback unwanted traffic to its source. Today’s
classification mechanisms rely primarily on IP addresses
and port numbers; unfortunately, these fields are often too
coarse and ephemeral, and moreover, they do not reflect traf-
fic’s provenance, associated trust, or relationship to other
processes or hosts. This paper presents the design, analy-
sis, user-space implementation, and evaluation of Pedigree,
which consists of two components: a trusted tagger that re-
sides on hosts and tags packets with information about their
provenance (i.e., identity and history of potential input from
hosts and resources for the process that generated them), and
an arbiter, which decides what to do with the traffic that car-
ries certain tags. Pedigree allows operators to write traffic
classification policies with expressive semantics that reflect
properties of the actual process that generated the traffic. Be-
yond offering new function and flexibility in traffic classifi-
cation, Pedigree represents a new and interesting point in the
design space between filtering and capabilities, and it allows
network operators to leverage host-based trust models to de-
cide treatment of network traffic.
1. Introduction
Enterprise and transit networks must be able to classify
and differentiate network traffic to enable provisioning and
keep networks secure. Ideally, operators would be able to
differentiate traffic according to expressive features, such as
the application that generates the traffic; the host or user
that generated the traffic, and the associated privileges of
that user; whether or not that host might be infected, and
so forth. Differentiating traffic on such features would allow
operators to upgrade or downgrade the service seen by par-
ticular traffic flows based on flexible attributes and properties
and would, as a result, facilitate much more expressive poli-
cies (e.g., filtering traffic based on whether the process that
generated the traffic had talked to a known infected host or
not). Operators might also want to control traffic based on
the properties of the process that generated it (i.e., the appli-
cation that generated it, or what other hosts or files may have
affected the process).
Today, traffic classification is coarse and imprecise. Net-
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work operators typically classify traffic using port num-
bers or IP addresses. This approach is often too coarse or
ephemeral. It is also indirect: IP addresses carry no informa-
tion about the provenance of the traffic, such as the process
(or group of processes, or host) that generated the traffic.
Providing this type of function is difficult: The large vol-
ume of traffic that traverses the network makes inspecting
each packet’s contents infeasible, and the packets have no
markings that bind them to a particular process or group of
processes on any particular host. We believe that significant
gains in network traffic monitoring require means to bind
that traffic back to a process group (and corresponding level
of trust) on a host.
This paper presents Pedigree, which allows network de-
vices to classify traffic based on the privileges and prove-
nance of that traffic, rather than a coarse identifier like an IP
address that carries no semantics. Pedigree allows network
operators to express policies based on (1) what container—a
persistent identifier for a resource (e.g., process group, vir-
tual machine)—generated the traffic; (2) what inputs the pro-
cess that generated the traffic has received (“taint set”). Pedi-
gree has two components, as shown in Figure 1. The first
component is the tagger, a trusted module that resides on the
host and tags traffic with the identification of the container
(“container ID”) and taint set of the process that initiated the
traffic. Users in an enterprise or customers of an ISP who
want to receive better service (e.g., provisioning, stronger
security guarantees) may install such a tagger. The second
module, the arbiter, resides on a network element and acts
on the traffic according to these tags and the network opera-
tor’s policy. Such actions might include filtering or shaping
the traffic, shunting the traffic to a deep packet inspection de-
vice, or re-routing the traffic to a better provisioned network
with stronger performance guarantees. Network elements
can either upgrade or downgrade traffic based on these tags,
which essentially blurs the distinction between the two ex-
treme design points of capabilities (i.e., keeping the network
“off by default” and permitting only certain traffic) and filter-
ing (i.e., keeping the network “on by default” and discarding
undesirable traffic).
The tags that each packet carries map to a host container
from which the traffic originated, and reflect the specific
properties of that container, such as whether it has access
to certain keys, whether it has been affected by other pro-
cesses or files (even across hosts), etc. Network elements
can then associate the tags that the traffic carries with a par-
ticular container that generated the traffic (or to the commu-
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Figure 1: High-level design of Pedigree.
nication history of the process that generated the traffic) and
take specific actions based on those tags, rather than acting
a on coarse-grained, ephemeral handle such as an IP address
or port. Unlike IP addresses, these container IDs and taints
are persistent: Even if a host changes its location or IP ad-
dress, or if it reboots, the markers on traffic that originate
from a particular host can always be tracked back to the pro-
cess group that generated them.
Pedigree marks packets with tags that have two distinct
components: container ID, which is deterministic (and, in
some cases, cryptographic) and essentially acts as an attesta-
tion regarding what container generated the traffic on a par-
ticular host; and taints, which reflect the set of tags that a
container accumulates by taking inputs from other files, pro-
cesses, and network sockets. Each packet carries such a tag
all the way to its destination; in principle, any network ele-
ment along the path could take action (e.g., filter, provision)
based on this tag. A network element that wants to make
a provisioning, forwarding, or filtering decision (an arbiter)
can then make forwarding decisions using policy based on
the container IDs, the taints, or a conjunction of the two (as,
reflected in the examples above). Although the arbiter could
certainly also reside in a trusted domain on the host, classi-
fying tagged traffic with an arbiter that is separate from the
host itself has two main advantages: First, Pedigree’s tags
allow an arbiter to classify traffic based on relationships and
correlations that may exist across hosts. Second, updating
traffic policies may be more manageable than doing so at
individual hosts.
Implementing Pedigree entails several challenges. First,
the tags must be resilient to forgery, minting, and replay: A
host or element that observes the tags on one packet should
have no mechanism or incentive to “steal” those tags to gain
a higher privilege. Similarly, a host should not be able to
mint a new set of tags to evade blacklisting or attain higher
privileges. Second, tagging must be fast: A host must be able
to tag packets as quickly as an application can send them, to
avoid degrading application service. Similarly, arbitration
must also be fast: network elements must be able to perform
arbitration at line rate.
This paper presents the following contributions. First, we
present a new framework for classifying traffic that leverages
a trusted component on the host to help operators attribute
semantics and trust to network traffic. This framework has
two conceptual contributions: extending host-based security
models into the network and highlighting a new point in the
design space between filtering (“on by default”) and capa-
bilities (“off by default”). Second, we design and implement
Pedigree, a system that operates within this framework to
help both enterprise networks and ISPs classify traffic based
on provenance and trust levels. Third, we present a user-
space prototype implementation of Pedigree and show that
packet and storage overhead is negligible for all but short
connections.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
discusses motivating applications. Section 3 describes the
trust model that Pedigree assumes. Section 4 presents the
main idea of Pedigree and presents the corresponding threat
model. Section 5 describes the detailed design of the tags
and taints, as well as how these taints propagate across the
processes within a host, as well as, across the hosts as mes-
sages traverse the network. Section 7 describes the proto-
type implementation of Pedigree. In Section 6, we analyze
the security of Pedigree under various threats; in Section 8,
we discuss the performance overhead of Pedigree. Section 9
discusses various optimizations and extensions, Section 10
discusses related work, and Section 11 concludes.
2. Motivation
Whereas today’s traffic classification and filtering meth-
ods attempt to classify traffic based on second-order effects,
the ideal scenario would allow operators to track first-order
effects, such as filtering traffic that comes from processes
that are known to be infected, or communicating with other
infected hosts. Although much previous work has been
done to track interactions and assign trust levels to processes
within hosts, all of this information is lost when network
traffic leaves the host and enters the network. Network de-
vices currently have no way to exercise complex policy be-
cause traffic is completely devoid of any information that
can be tied to provenance or semantics. The main goal of
Pedigree is to extend trust levels and semantics that can be
attributed host-level processes into the network. Today, fil-
tering and classification devices rely on port numbers and
IP addresses to attribute semantics to traffic. These ap-
proaches are inadequate; network devices could implement
more expressive policies if traffic carried additional informa-
tion about the host process that originated the traffic.
2.1 Today’s Classification: Indirect and Brittle
Relying chiefly on heuristics based on IP address and port
numbers to classify network traffic is both indirect and brit-
tle: Classifying traffic based on an IP address or port indi-
rectly expresses an operator’s intent to perform some higher
level action (e.g., rate-limiting peer-to-peer traffic, filtering
spam). In addition, these classification rules are brittle as
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they require change when traffic sources change. In this sec-
tion, we elaborate on these shortcomings.
Why not IP addresses? Many filters, blacklists, and ac-
cess control lists are based on IP addresses, such as DNS-
based blacklists (DNSBLs) for spam prevention. Unfortu-
nately, the IP addresses that send spam continually change
(i.e., incidentally due to dynamic addressing and intention-
ally, due to techniques such as route hijacking [24]), making
it difficult to keep these lists up to date. Although statistical
and behavioral blacklisting methods (e.g., [14, 23]) can help
counteract the dynamism of IP addresses by tracking behav-
ioral invariants, these methods rely on indirect inference. A
better method would allow operators to track the privilege
and provenance of traffic based on deterministic properties
that are contained in the packets themselves.
Why not port numbers? Operators also use port numbers
to attribute traffic to applications. For example, operators
rate-limit peer-to-peer traffic, or assign higher priority to
real-time traffic, using destination port numbers that corre-
spond to well-known services. For example, because many
botnets use Internet Relay Chat (IRC) for their rallying be-
havior, inspecting IRC traffic used to be a reliable method
of detecting such traffic. Today, however, many applications
use non-standard ports, which makes it difficult to identify
such applications without expensive deep packet inspection
(DPI). As malicious applications are increasingly attempt-
ing evasion of port-based filtering by rallying using common
ports (e.g., HTTP [2] or peer-to-peer protocols [26]), even
applying DPI becomes impractical.
2.2 Pedigree: Robust and Direct
Pedigree’s tags (described in detail in Section 4) pro-
vide the following semantics to traffic: (1) the trust asso-
ciated with the process (or group of processes) that gener-
ated the traffic (“What is the entity that generated the traf-
fic?”); (2) the provenance of the process or group of pro-
cesses that generated the traffic (“Who has this entity been
‘talking to’?”). These semantics enable several new func-
tions and applications because they directly reflect the se-
mantics an operator might want to express. Because these
tags are persistent (Section 4, these semantics are also ro-
bust. The rest of this section describes functions that these
tags facilitate. Pedigree allows all of these applications to be
implemented within a single, coherent framework.
Provisioning Operators may sometimes prioritize for certain
types of applications (e.g., prioritize VoIP, de-prioritize peer-
to-peer traffic, etc.) or between certain customers (e.g., en-
terprise sites, specific users). To prioritize traffic for certain
applications today, operators must write policies that clas-
sify traffic based on brittle identifiers such as IP addresses
or port numbers, which suffer from a number of drawbacks.
Instead, operators might want to classify traffic using a tag
that directly links network traffic to the entity that gener-
ated it and provides information about whether or not that
principal belongs to a certain group. Certain tags could, for
example, provide access to better provisioned, less loaded,
or lower latency paths over “standard” paths (in this context,
upgrades are analogous to capabilities [36]).
Blacklisting Unwanted traffic such as spam, denial of ser-
vice attacks, and illegal content distribution are taxing net-
work and system resources. Eradicating such traffic is chal-
lenging because of their similarity to legitimate traffic, and
operators must often resort to some form of deep packet
inspection, which may be impractical on high-speed links;
even with fast DPI technology, encrypted traffic can still
evade being downgraded [33, 31].
Instead, tags that identified the application that originated
the traffic and tracked the history of the application that gen-
erated the traffic (e.g., whether that application had commu-
nicated with other known malicious processes) could be used
to rate-limit or filter traffic from these applications.
Exfiltration Enterprise network administrators must protect
internal hosts from compromise and prevent private data or
resources from leaving certain designated areas of the net-
work (“data leakage”, or exfiltration). Current solutions for
exfiltration involve either routing all traffic that leaves the
network through a middlebox that performs expensive (and
often ineffective) DPI-based watermarking techniques, or
filtering certain ports, which both benign and malicious pro-
cesses can evade using encryption or tunneling. Using tags
that could associate network data transfers from a host to
files that are being read on the host, operators can reliably
and cheaply ensure that only data pertaining to non-critical
files leave the enterprise network.
Secure network regions Applications such as online bank-
ing authenticate customers at the application layer (or above)
but have no way to ensure that traffic is not being routed
to (or through) malicious entities; such subversion may be
performed even by a keylogger on the host that has no priv-
ileges. A network operator may wish to enforce that traffic
destined to such “secure regions” originate only from trusted
applications. In order to implement this policy, the operator
can require that destined to certain parts of the network from
a user’s computer necessarily contain tags that indicate that
the application that generated the traffic possesses a valid
credential (such as a private-key signature); an egress router
could authenticate the credential before forwarding the traf-
fic.
3. Trust Model and Assumptions
Because arbiters in the middle of the network make deci-
sions about how to forward traffic based on Pedigree’s tags,
malicious processes or network entities have an incentive to
try to manipulate these tags. Accordingly, we make some
assumptions about the capabilities of various entities in the
network to observe and manipulate the tags. This section
discusses two important assumptions: First, that network el-
ements are trusted and, as a result, do not manipulate the
tags. Second, that the host based tagger (i.e., the entity
that annotates the packet with tags that conveys information
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about provenance and privilege) is trusted. The rest of this
section discusses these two assumptions in more detail.
Assumption 1: Network elements do not modify tags.
Pedigree requires that network elements on the path (i.e.,
routers, switches, intrusion detection systems, proxies, or
firewalls) will: (1) forward packets from sender to recipient
without modifying Pedigree’s tags; (2) not use information
gleaned from tags for malicious purposes. Because network
elements are usually operated by ISPs or enterprises, and
because users already implicitly trust network elements to
forward packets to modifying higher-layer packet headers or
payloads, we believe that this assumption is reasonable.
Assumption 2: The end-host has a trusted component that
is always at a higher privilege level than any untrusted re-
source.
Pedigree requires that the component on the host that main-
tains provenance information for all resources on the host,
attaches tags to outgoing packets, and incorporates tag in-
formation from incoming packets into the reading process’s
provenance, is trusted. In order to deploy the tagger at the
correct trust level, we divide all entities (processes, kernel,
Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM), hardware, etc.) on gen-
eral purpose operating systems into the five distinct trust lev-
els listed below. Also shown is the tagger deployment option
assuming a given trust level is the highest for all untrusted
components in the system.
1. User-level unprivileged processes: These processes
cannot modify resources owned by other users (unless
explicitly granted permission). Tagger Deployment: As
a privileged process or daemon.
2. User-level privileged process: These processes have
super-user rights and may modify any resource at the
user-level. They, however, must issue system calls to
the kernel to gain access to physical resources. Tagger
Deployment: As a protected kernel module accessible
only to the system administrator (e.g., using passphrase
protection) 1.
3. Kernel-level process, either as a module or as built-in
code: These processes have unrestricted access to all
virtual (e.g., vfs) and physical resources. Tagger De-
ployment: If the kernel is vulnerable, the administrator
must execute the operating system in a virtual machine,
and deploy the tagger secure code within the hypervi-
sor [11].
1In current operating systems, the distinction between trust level 2 (user-
level privileged process) and trust level 3 (kernel-level process or module)
is blurry: any process that has super-user privileges on an operating system
can install arbitrary code (as a module) to the kernel, or even change the ker-
nel itself. Pedigree requires that processes at one trust level cannot affect
processes at higher trust levels; enforcing this separation between levels 2
and 3 requires a modification to the kernel to ensure that only certain priv-
ileged processes explicitly authorized by the user (e.g., using a passphrase
that is known only to the user and the running kernel) can change kernel
parameters or load or unload modules. With this modification, executing
the tagger as a kernel-level process will be sufficient most general purpose
computers. Surveys show that for most operating systems are exploited due
to vulnerabilities present in user-level process or services (privileged or un-
privileged); kernels are largely free of exploitable vulnerabilities [32].
4. VMM level: If the OS is executed within a virtual ma-
chine, the virtual machine monitor (or hypervisor) runs
at a higher privilege level than the guest operating sys-
tem (e.g., Xen [1]). Tagger Deployment: If the VMM
is susceptible to compromise, the tagger must be run
within a trusted hardware module.
5. Trusted computing platform: If the platform is
equipped with a hardware chip that executes trusted
code, the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) becomes the
highest level of trust for the platform. Tagger Deploy-
ment: If the hardware on a host cannot be trusted, the
tagger must be deployed outside the host (e.g., a home
router or cable modem).
The administrator of a end-host can decide the highest
threat level to assign for untrusted processes based on an-
ticipated threats: a general-purpose desktop computer may
execute arbitrary code at user-level, so deploying the tagger
at kernel level (level 3) is viable. Section 6.1 deals with this
issue in greater detail.
4. Pedigree: System Design and Function
This section presents the design of Pedigree. Section 4.1
discusses the portion of Pedigree that resides on end hosts,
and tracks provenance and interactions between resources
within a host: the tagger. Section 4.2 discusses the the ar-
biter, which resides in the network and uses the information
contained tags to classify traffic.
4.1 On The Host: Tags
Pedigree tracks interactions between resources (i.e., files,
processes, and sockets) in an operating system and attributes
persistent tags to each resource. Pedigree annotates outgoing
traffic with tags. When a process sends data on the network,
Pedigree’s tagger annotates outgoing packets with a tag that
represent the provenance of a packet: essentially, the pro-
cess that generated the traffic and where it has taken input
from. When a process reads data from the network, the tag-
ger updates the reading process’s tags with tags on incoming
packets. We describe the semantics and structure of these
tags and how they are used to track interactions.
4.1.1 Tag semantics and structure
Semantics. Tags convey two types of information: (1) lo-
cal properties about the process that generates the traffic
(e.g., information about the application generating the traf-
fic, whether or not the user of some process possesses a key);
and (2) the history of interactions of that container with other
local and remote containers. The tags that are assigned to a
given application’s processes (as well as its derivatives, such
as child processes) are unique and survive reboots, but the
tags for the same kind of application on different machines
are distinguishable from each other. The tags also serve as
audit trails about interactions between resource (“who-talks-
to-whom” ), thus allowing a network device to filter traffic
based on the who or what the process that generated the traf-
fic has interacted with.
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Figure 2: Structure of a tag in Pedigree.
Structure. Figure 2 illustrates the structure of Pedigree’s
tags. Tags have two parts: (1) a container ID, which al-
lows network elements to unforgeably identify the sender’s
unique host ID and application details (e.g., whether the
sender is using an approved Web browser program); (2) a
taint set, which provides information about a container’s in-
teraction with other applications and hosts.
The container ID identifies a virtual “container” within
which all of the resources of an application are constrained,
analogous to the terminology used in virtualization technolo-
gies like OpenVZ [21]. The container ID has two parts: (1) a
global host identifier (GHID), which is a unique integer that
is either tied to the installed operating system or to a unique
hardware serial number on the device2, and (2) an applica-
tion ID (AppID), is a unique, persistent, integer associated
with an application program, such as the binary file used to
start the application, its configuration files, etc. All of the ap-
plication’s resources—the application binary files, files cre-
ated by the application, the application’s processes and pro-
cess group, etc.—have the same persistent application ID.
The taint set for a resource stores the identifiers of all the
other resources (local or remote) that it has interacted with
in the past. In a fresh install of a typical operating system,
Pedigree initializes the taint set of all the resources with the
GHID and the respective AppID.
Pedigree maintains the taint set as a compact set data
structure; our implementation uses a Bloom filter [3]. The
size of the Bloom filter depends on the expected number
of unique members and acceptable false positive rate for
lookups. Pedigree compresses the taint sets while transmit-
ting them as part of tags in the packets. Pedigree further
reduces the overhead by including full taint set only at the
start of the connection and using a hash on the subsequent
packets.
Some processes may use the cryptographic token to in-
dicate authorization to receive, say, better quality of ser-
vice or access to a trusted network region. Depending on
the key distribution mechanism and the nature of authoriza-
tion required, this token might be an HMAC over fields in
the packet and tag, a signature, or even a network capabil-
ity [36].
4.1.2 Tracking interactions with tags
The tagger maintains each resource’s current tag, either
within the structure that the operating system uses to main-
2The tagger on a machine can choose the set of serial numbers it wants to
use to construct the GHID, as long as it can construct it again. The function
may even be different per host.
tain resource metadata (e.g., in the Linux kernel, the tag can
be added as an extra field in the inode for a file, or as a field
in task struct for a process), or at a central location that
contains tag informations of all resources (e.g., a database).
The tagger updates the tags as processes are executed and
interact with resources. Figure 3 shows the three ways that
tags are propagated
1. Resource A reads from Resource B or Resource B
writes to Resource A In this case, because both A and
B already exist (e.g., a process reads from a file or a
network socket), Pedigree updates the taint set of A
to include all of B’s taints. The container IDs of both
processes are unchanged.
2. Resource A creates Resource B. Because only pro-
cesses can create resources, A will be a process. B
may be another process (created using fork(2) in
POSIX), a file, or a network socket. In this case, all
fields of A’s tags are copied as B’s newly created tags.
3. Resource A executes Resource B. In this case, A re-
places its own process image by executing the binary
file B, using a system call such as execve(2) in
POSIX. Pedigree sets the new process’s AppID to the
hash of the file B. The new process’s taint set is set to
the taint set of the file B. If A passes data to the new
process through execve, Pedigree also updates the
taint set of the new process with A’s taint set.
Case 1 includes taints acquired by reading data from the
network, as well as from files and other processes. If incom-
ing network packets are carrying tags, the tagger updates the
reading process’s tags with tags from network packets; the
contents of these tags will be propagated to other resources
that the reading process creates or writes.
Case 2 includes new files or sockets created by processes
(using open(2), or new processes (using fork(2)).
Child processes inherit the parent process’s full tag when
they are created, but changes to the taint sets of either the
parent or child after creation are not propagated unless there
is an explicit read between the two (using IPC or shared
memory).
In Case 3, the tagger replaces the AppID with a hash to
retain consistent AppIDs for the same application across re-
boots or multiple instances of the same application: irrespec-
tive of the process executing the application, the AppID of
a process created using a specific binary file will remain the
same. Enterprises can use the AppID to ensure whether a
program generating traffic is authorized or not.
These three rules allow Pedigree to propagate tags for
any type of interaction between resources, both within and
across hosts. Pedigree’s taint propagation mechanism is
transitive: if resource A sends data to resource B, who in turn
sends data to resource C, resource C’s taint set will include
resource A’s set as well. As we show in the next section,
this important property allows Pedigree to track the history
of interactions between files, processes, and hosts, which is

























































Figure 3: The system calls that cause Pedigree to update tags of involved
resources. CR refers to the Container ID of resource R, and SR refers
to the taint set of R. 4
also susceptible to overflow; we discuss this issue in Sec-
tion 5.3.
Although we have designed and implemented Pedigree
around a POSIX-based Linux system, all general-purpose
operating systems offer equivalent interfaces to applications.
4.2 In The Network: Arbitration
Once packets have been tagged, any network element
along the path to a destination can perform arbitration to de-
cide how each packet should be treated. We use the term
arbiter to refer to a network element (e.g., proxy servers,
routers, authentication servers, intrusion detection systems,
and load balancing systems) that inspects some part of the
packet’s tag (i.e., the container ID, the taint set, or both)
and takes some action based on its value (e.g., filtering, re-
routing, etc.).
Pedigree’s tags allow network elements to either upgrade
or downgrade the level of service that some traffic sees based
on the tags carried in the packets. Operators can provide
improved levels of service to applications that present ap-
propriate authorization (i.e., as a cryptographic token in the
container ID). On the other hand, an arbiter can drop, rate-
limit, or de-prioritize the low-priority or unwanted traffic.
The rest of this section describes those actions in more de-
tail.
Controlling access to resources. An arbiter could inspect
the fixed fields on packet tags such as the AppID or signature
to perform authentication for access to a restricted resource
or secure region of the network (as described in Section 2).
4Pedigree does not treat network sockets separately as a socket normally
maps one-to-one to its controlling process.
This scenario is most applicable in an enterprise network,
where key management and distribution can be controlled
and users can be asked to run common software (e.g., the
tagger). An arbiter could use the AppID to ensure that a
user’s traffic was generated using authorized software. It can
also use the token to control access to more critical services,
(e.g., online banking portals).
Curtailing unwanted traffic. An arbiter that merely pre-
vents malicious application traffic from passing through will
only need to check whether a certain packet’s taint set con-
tains one or more taints belonging to known malware. For
example, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSes) or firewalls
may inspect the taint set to check for membership of taints
of known malicious applications. To blacklist traffic, an IDS
might maintain a blacklist of taints known to belong to ma-
licious files or servers and the taint sets of incoming packets
to determine whether it contains any blacklisted taint. Pedi-
gree’s taint set is a Bloom filter, so the arbiter only needs
to perform a simple bitwise AND between the Bloom fil-
ters corresponding to a packet and a Bloom filter containing
the sought malware taint. The query returns true (i.e., the
packet on the wire contains the taint of the sought malware)
if the resulting Bloom filter is equivalent to the Bloom fil-
ter containing the malware. Upon discovering the presence
of a taint, the IDS can take further action (e.g., filter, drop,
rate-limit, inspect payload).
5. Practical Considerations
Deploying Pedigree on a real network faces several practi-
cal concerns such as increased packet size, overhead in stor-
ing tags on each host, potential for misclassification due to
overflow of the taint set of a resource’s tag, etc.; in addi-
tion, Pedigree also needs to be hardened against a variety of
attacks. This section addresses the practical considerations
in deploying Pedigree, while Section 6 discusses attack de-
fenses.
5.1 Packet Overhead
The taint set portion of a process’s tag is a significant over-
head if sent uncompressed with every packet in a connection.
To reduce packet overhead, Pedigree performs two optimiza-
tions: (1) Pedigree sends the full tag only at the beginning of
a connection, with subsequent packets carrying only a hash
computed on the tag; and (2) because the Bloom filter (i.e.,
taint set) that makes up the bulk of the tag is typically sparse,
Pedigree compresses it using a fast algorithm.
Avoiding full tags on every packet. To reduce the per-
packet overhead due to Pedigree’s tags for a network con-
nection, the tagger sends the full tag only once, during the
connection setup phase (e.g., the three-way handshake of
TCP-based protocols). Subsequent packets only contain a
well-known hash function computed on the tag. Arbiters
may compute the hash independently for verification, and
even use this hashed string as the key to quickly look up
the classification decision for later packets in the same con-
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Figure 4: Golomb-Rice compression gain and latency evaluated using
a Bloom filter (of maximum capacity 100,000 taints) as more taints are
inserted.
changes after the beginning of the connection (e.g., because
the process acquired more taints by reading from another re-
source), only the newly set bits (and the hash of the new tag)
are sent on subsequent packets.
Compressing Bloom filters. The uncompressed size of
the Bloom filter depends on the expected number of taints
a resource can acquire during its lifetime, and the maximum
false positive rate for the chosen maximum number of taints.
Using standard Bloom filter calculations [3], a Bloom filter
that supports 100,000 insertions with a false positive rate of
0.01 or less requires approximately 127 KB.
To reduce the in-transit size of the filter, Pedigree com-
presses it before attaching it to network packets. The com-
pression scheme used must be fast enough to not hamper
packet processing, but effective enough to provide signifi-
cant compression gain. Because the run-lengths of 0 bits
in a Bloom filter follow a geometric distribution, Pedigree
uses Golomb-Rice codes that are optimal for such distribu-
tions [25]. Golomb-Rice encoding is parametric: it does not
require the computationally expensive sliding window look-
ahead used by algorithms such as Deflate [22].
Figure 4 plots the variation in compression ratios, as
well as the latency in encoding and decoding measured us-
ing our implementation of the Golomb-Rice algorithm, as
more taints are inserted into an initially-empty Bloom filter.
For sparse Bloom filters, Golomb-Rice encoding achieves
high compression ratios, but understandably degrades as
the Bloom filter reaches its capacity (because the filter ap-
proaches a uniform random binary string). The encoding
and decoding latencies—especially if performed only once
per a new connection—are also reasonable.
With the two optimizations above, the packet overhead
due to Pedigree’s tags is acceptable. For a typical sparse
Bloom filter, compression ratios of one-tenth are possible,
enabling Pedigree to represent a 128 KiB taint set in less
than 10 KiB. The container ID is also small, amounting to
32 bytes including a signature in our implementation. The
full tag (approximately 10 KiB) needs to be sent only once
per connection, and subsequent packets only carry a 20-byte
hash of the tag, provided the tags of the sending process do
not change mid-connection. Thus, for a 10 MB file transfer
using 1500 byte packets, the overhead due to Pedigree’s tags
amounts to only 1.5%.
5.2 Storage Overhead
Tags should use as little storage as possible. Pedigree
stores only the tags of active resources (open files and run-
ning processes) in physical memory; the in-memory stor-
age is of fixed-size and these entries are replaced (by writing
through to disk) using a least-recently used (LRU) policy.
The tags of all permanent resources (i.e., files), as well
as the tags of transient resource which cannot be accommo-
dated in physical memory, are stored on disk. To reduce the
overhead due to the permanent store, Pedigree could main-
tain only one copy of the taint set (which accounts for the
bulk of the tag) between all resources that have the same
taint set; this optimization would especially be useful in rep-
resenting the taint sets of all resources that have the initial,
default taint. Yet another optimization involves maintaining
only “diff” of the taint set for a resource if its taint set is sim-
ilar to that of another resource (e.g., two copies of the same
file which have been written to by two different processes).
Even without optimization, the number of permanent tags
that Pedigree will accumulate on a host is linearly bound to
the number of regular files on the disk.
5.3 Taint Set Overflow
Host processes continuously accumulate taints as they
communicate with other processes (local or across the net-
work) and read files, but their taint sets can accommodate
only a fixed number of taints before the false positive rates
increase beyond acceptable levels; we call this occurrence
“taint set overflow”. If false positive likelihood of a taint set
is high, arbiters will not act upon the presence of a malicious
taint in the taint set, due to the risk of misclassifying traffic
from processes that may have legitimately overflowed their
taint sets. Malicious processes may attempt to capitalize on
the arbiter’s inability, and intentionally create an overflow of
their taint sets in order to “hide” their malicious taints among
many others (e.g., by contacting arbitrary hosts on the Inter-
net, and acquiring at least one new taint per host).
To prevent a resource’s taint set from overflowing, Pedi-
gree clears portions of full (or nearly full) taint sets. Clear-
ing bits, however, induces false negatives in Bloom filter
lookups. In this section, we first argue that most resources
on a typical end-user operating system are unlikely to ever
overflow their taint sets We then present two schemes to un-
set portions of a Bloom filter as fills up, as well as a mech-
anism for clustering hosts that exchange resources based on
common taints.
5.3.1 Likelihood of Taint Set Overflow
Most legitimate applications on end-hosts accumulate
only a fixed number of taints in their taint set. Even for ap-




















Figure 5: Evaluation of bit resetting Scheme 1: The taints that are
inserted last to the Bloom filter have a higher average similarity value
than earlier taints.
they accumulate in one session (i.e., the time that a particular
process executing the application binary is alive) are usually
not carried over to the next session, as these applications
never read files that they wrote to disk in a previous session.
For example, if a Web browser process P on a host down-
loads the file F from a remote host, the taint set of P , SP ,
will be updated as SP := SP ∪ SF , which will also be the
taint set of the copy of file F written to the host’s disk. The
taint set of the browser’s binary file itself is not affected, and
the next process executing the binary file will not acquire
file F ’s taints. Contemporary browsers such as Firefox fork
child processes for each download which die after the down-
load completes; such forking further segregates the taints of
the downloaded files from the parent browser process.
Admittedly, the number of taints that a legitimate pro-
cess can acquire in a session depends on usage pat-
terns, and representative figures for taints acquired by end-
user applications cannot be obtained without an exten-
sive user study. Even so, the number of taints required
to fill up a Bloom filter—approximately 100,000 in our
implementation—requires the host process to contact at least
the same order of different remote processes within one ses-
sion, which we believe is unlikely.
5.3.2 Probabilistic Bit Resetting
In order to prevent taint set overflows, we instrument the
tagger to reset one or more bits from a resource’s Bloom fil-
ter if the filter is filled beyond a threshold. Unfortunately,
if bits in a Bloom filter are reset, the filter loses the prop-
erty of never returning a false negative: even the keys (i.e.,
taints) that were inserted into the filter may not have all of
their corresponding bits set. To address this issue, the arbiter
must modify its technique for querying a taint set for mem-
bership of a particular taint: instead of verifying that all bits
corresponding to the k hashes for a certain key are set, the
arbiter must use a similarity metric, which may be the frac-
tion of bits (out of k) that are set for any given key (i.e.,
taint). Depending on the type of taints that are preserved, we
present two strategies for resetting bits.
Scheme 1: Preserve later taints. The first scheme involves
resetting one or more bits with equal probability each time
a new taint is inserted. This scheme preserves recently in-
serted taints. To verify that taints inserted later are likely
to have higher similarity scores than earlier taints, we inten-
tionally cause a Bloom filter to overflow, and measure the
average similarity of inserted taints. Figure 5 shows the av-
erage similarity of buckets of taints, sorted by age (i.e., a
taint with lower age is inserted later), for 1,500 taints in-
serted into a Bloom filter. We instrumented the Bloom filter
to allow bit resetting to kick in after very few taints are in-
serted. In Figure 5, the last inserted 100 taints have average
similarity of 1, indicating that these taints are hardly affected
by resetting.
This scheme is suitable for legitimate application pro-
cesses that acquire taints over the course of their normal op-
eration, such as Web browsers: the taints of newly read (i.e.,
downloaded) files—which could potentially be malicious—
remain unmodified until they are written to disk as separate
files, at the expense of taints of files read earlier.
Scheme 2: Preserve earlier taints. The second scheme
requires storing a snapshot of the Bloom filter for each re-
source at the time the resource was first created on the host.
When bits need to be reset, the current Bloom filter is com-
pared with the snapshot, and common bits are given high-
est priority against resetting. The scheme thus protects older
bits at the expense of newly set bits, and is suitable for poten-
tially untrusted application binaries: in the case of malware,
the taints in the snapshot likely include the malicious taints,
and the bits corresponding to these taints will be preserved
even if the malicious program later attempts to acquire a
large number of taints.
5.4 Automatically Identifying Taints
Using Pedigree, a network administrator who knows the
taints associated with the malware can filter traffic generated
by malicious programs, where these taints are presumably
acquired through another source (e.g., by directly contact-
ing the malware hosting server, from a honeypot, etc.). This
process, however, requires the administrator to acquire the
taints of these malware in order to perform lookups on real-
time traffic. These requirements are hard to meet: miscre-
ants release many new variants of malware each day [5], and
there will be significant delays before security researchers
can obtain and classify these taints. In fact, it is precisely
because of this large influx of new malware variants (many
of them auto-generated, such as polymorphic worms) that
manual classification is hard. Pedigree’s resource tracking
mechanism ensures that even these polymorphic variants of
worms inherit the taints of the original malware binary; thus,
although the malware processes on each host will have taints
specific to that host, they will all posses a subset of common
taints that were embedded in the first copy of the malware
executable (e.g., from the malware hosting Web site). 5
Arbiters in the core of the network are in a position to
observe traffic generated by a malicious program from dif-
ferent hosts, and can apply clustering on the taint sets of
traffic from these hosts in order to discover: (1) groups of
host processes that possess common subsets of taints; and
(2) the bits in the Bloom filter corresponding to the com-
mon subset of taints for a group. In this section, we present
5This statement assumes that all copies of a malware have the same root, but
this assumption is not necessary: clustering will merely group the subsets
of malware processes with different root taints in separate clusters, which
is equally beneficial to the operator.
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Varying number of clusters (C)
Fixed params: B = 50; b = 2000; a = 1000; N = C × B
Clusters, C Clusters Found Avg. FNs Avg. FPs
5 5 0 1.6
10 10 0 3.6
15 24 0 1.45
20 20 0 1.6
25 28 0 1.6
Varying number of noise taint sets (N )
Fixed params: C = 5; B = 50; b = 2000; a = 1000
Noise, N Clusters Found Avg. FNs Avg. FPs
50 8 0 0
100 8 0 1.4
150 7 0 0
200 5 0 0
250 5 0 1.6
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
600 7 0 2
Varying noise within clusters (a)
Fixed params: C = 5; B = 50; N = 250 b = 2000
Cluster Noise, a Clusters Found Avg. FNs Avg. FPs
500 7 0 2.29
1000 8 0 1.75
1500 6 0 0.5
2000 6 0 0.83
2500 5 6.6 1.2
Notation
b – Initial taints per cluster B – Taint sets per cluster
C – Number of clusters a – Random taints per taint set
N – Number of “ambient noise” taint sets
Table 1: Clusters identified using different simulation parameters. Avg
FNs indicate the average False Negatives per cluster, and Avg. FPs in-
dicate average False Positives per cluster. All experiments were per-
formed using a Bloom filter that supports 10,000 insertions.
a clustering-based algorithm that arbiters can deploy to au-
tomatically identify taint sets that have subsets of taints in
common, which will likely be the case for a particular mal-
ware variant that runs on many infected hosts on the Internet.
Our algorithm uses the idea that, although some clusters
are likely to be non-malicious (e.g., different host processes
using a particular software downloaded from the same Web
site will cluster on the subset of taints corresponding to the
original copy of the software), the operator needs to manu-
ally verify only one host process’s traffic per cluster; once
one process’s traffic is identified as malicious, the operator
can automatically filter other traffic that clustered with the
identified traffic. In addition, the operator can also instru-
ment the clustering algorithm to return the smallest set of
‘1’ bits that define a cluster of malicious traffic; he can then
use this set as a direct filter on the taint sets of future traffic.
Evaluation. In this section, we evaluate how well the clus-
tering scheme described above identifies groups of related
processes (even from different hosts) that have a common
subset of tags. In our simulation, we create C clusters of B
taint sets (i.e., Bloom filters) each. All the taint sets within
any given cluster are initialized with the same b taints (but
with different taints across clusters). The initial taint set of
a cluster is analogous to the “root” taint of a malicious exe-
cutable before it spreads in the wild.
In order to simulate copies of a malware spreading across
different hosts and acquiring new taints, we now add a ran-
dom taints to each of the B taint sets of each cluster. All
taint sets are large enough to accommodate a+b taints. Each
taint within a cluster represents a different host process run-
ning the malware: they all possess the original b root taints,
but also posses a taints acquired due to later interactions be-
tween hosts and processes.
We also create N noise taint sets that each have a + b ran-
dom taints in order to simulate traffic with unrelated taint
sets that an arbiter will observe when attempting to clus-
ter taint sets in the network core. Finally, we input all taint
sets—C × B taint sets which have some taints in common,
and N noise taint sets—to Eigencluster [6], an unsupervised
spectral clustering algorithm, giving equal weight to each
taint set. Table 1 tabulates the number of clusters identified
by Eigencluster, the number of taint sets belonging to one
of the C clusters that were grouped with taints from another
cluster (False Negatives, or FNs), and the number of taint
sets from ambient noise, N , that were grouped with one of
the output clusters (False Positives, or FNs).
In each case, we expect: (1) Exactly C output clusters; (2)
No FNs (i.e., no element in a cluster was misclassified); and
(3) No FPs (i.e., no ambient noise was accidentally identi-
fied as belonging to a cluster). Our simulation shows that
the clustering does pick out all C × B taints and cluster
them (result not shown in Table 1), but the number of de-
tected clusters is sometimes slightly greater than the num-
ber of input clusters. There are no false negatives (except
when the common b taints within a cluster is overshadowed
by the b random taints added later): taint sets of processes
with common history will never cluster with another set of
processes. The existence of false positives (i.e., potentially
legitimate taint sets grouped with a malware cluster) ham-
pers blind filtering merely using the clustering output, but
the bulk of the noise—potentially legitimate taint sets—do
not form clusters. Because of the large reduction in “ambi-
ent noise”, it may be practical for the operator to channel all
taint sets from identified clusters to a deep packet inspection
device to weed out any false positives.
6. Protecting Pedigree from Attack
This section discusses host and network-based attacks
against Pedigree and defenses against them.
6.1 Host-based Threats
Pedigree is vulnerable to several host-based threats that
might allow a process to interfere with tagging. We discuss
threats in increasing order of the capabilities of a malicious
process.
Threat 1: Malware is a user-space, unprivileged process.
For this threat, an administrator assumes that the only un-
trusted components of the operating system are unprivileged
processes running in user-space. The tagger can then be de-
ployed as a user-space, privileged process through which all
outgoing (or incoming) packets are routed before they cross
to (or from) kernel-space. Trusting all privileged processes
may be reasonable for OS architectures where the amount
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of trusted code is minimized (e.g., embedded OSes, L4 Mi-
crokernel [18], Exokernel [7], HiStar [37], etc.) or special-
purpose devices where the user cannot typically run pro-
cesses with super-user privileges.
Threat 2: Malware is a user-space, privileged process.
If the kernel is trusted, the tagger can be a kernel mod-
ule. Still, most operating systems also allow processes with
super-user privileges to change various parameters of the
running kernel, or even load and unload modules from the
kernel; thus privileged malicious process might bypass the
tagger by interfering with its parameters or even unloading
the module entirely. To counter this attack, we suggest even
a privileged process should present credentials (e.g., a pass-
word) to the kernel to change kernel settings.
Threat 3: Malware is a kernel module.
If malware can gain kernel rights (e.g., by inserting a ker-
nel module), it can typically bypass, corrupt, or completely
eradicate a software-based tagger. There exist two methods
to deploy the tagger at a level below the kernel. First, the
operating system, and all its processes, can be run inside a
virtual machine [28, 29, 34]. In this case, the tagger will re-
side either in the hypervisor, or in the trusted domain (e.g.,
Dom0 for Xen, the host OS in VMWare or UML). All un-
trusted programs will only be run in one of the untrusted
domains. The tagger maintains the tags of processes and
files of the untrusted OS outside the OS, and is therefore
protected even if the untrusted OS is compromised. Second,
the tagger can be deployed as a hardware chip (e.g., within
a Trusted Computing Platform) through which all incoming
and outgoing packets are routed.
6.2 Network-Based Threats
Only hosts that do not have a tagger installed can attempt
to mount attacks against Pedigree’s tags. Such hosts may
eavesdrop for tags on local networks, or attempt to manu-
facture tags to gain access to some resource. Of course, if
a host has not deployed Pedigree, then all information being
carried in the tags will be lost when processes on this ma-
chine take inputs from tagged packets and generate untagged
traffic of their own. ISPs can encourage users to deploy tag-
gers in various ways (e.g., providing preferential treatment
of traffic).
Threat 4: Eavesdropper attempts to spoof or replay tags (or
credentials in tags).
Although no host with a tagger can eavesdrop on tags,
malicious hosts may eavesdrop on packets on the wire and
mount attacks such as denial of privileges, replaying another
host’s packets, etc. To prevent valid tags from being re-
played by eavesdroppers, Pedigree includes a re-initializable
hash chains[9] as a cryptographic credential in the tag. Re-
initializable hash chains (RHC) are a variant of finite-length
one-way hash chains [17] that can be securely re-initialized
once the hash chain is exhausted. For each connection, Pedi-
gree sets up a new RHC. For the first packet in a connection,
the tag includes the first value of the RHC. Additionally,
the cryptographic signature included with the first packet is
performed over the self-identifying message (comprising the
GHID, AppID, taint set, source IP address, and source port)
concatenated with the first entry of the RHC. As before, ev-
ery subsequent packet carries the hash of the first packet’s
tag, as well as the next entry in the RHC. When the arbiter
receives the first packet, it verifies the signature using the
fields in the tag. After the signature is verified, the arbiter
stores the current value of the RHC, and uses it to verify that
new packets purported to belong to the same connection are
not replays.
The eavesdropper may spoof other portions of the tag, in-
cluding the global host ID (GHID) and the application ID
(AppID). These fields are not cryptographically meaningful,
and thus the arbiter will not typically use them to authenti-
cate traffic. Still, if the tagger knows the arbiter’s public key,
it may encrypt all fields in the container ID portion of the
tag. This approach requires the arbiter to have certified key
pairs and key distribution services.
Because the taint set portion of the tag is typically a com-
pact set representation that uses a probabilistic data structure
(Pedigree uses a Bloom filter), membership queries to the
taint may return a false positive. As result, we do not envi-
sion that the arbiter would use the taint set as a credential;
thus, there would be very little incentive for an eavesdropper
to replay a taint set.
Threat 5: Eavesdropper changes tags to evade blacklisting,
filtering, or other service degradation.
Using container ID fields to filter or blacklist is reliable
only when the network administrator is assured that all hosts
on a network have a trusted tagger installed; otherwise, a
malicious host may simply change the values of fields to
evade the filter. This is a reasonable assumption in enter-
prises where all hosts run a trusted OS that has the tagger
pre-installed.
In the wide-area, filters based on container IDs can be eas-
ily evaded since these IDs can be minted or forged. Thus,
arbiters in the wide-area must use the taint set. A malicious
process may still try to modify a taint set that was blocked
by the arbiter in order to construct a different taint set that
will be allowed by the arbiter. As a defense, the ISP might
encourage or require its users to necessarily install taggers
to receive normal service, and instrument “verified” taggers
with a credential that the ISP’s arbiter can verify; this cre-
dential may be a scheme to add a new taint to the taint set
of each packet that exits the host. The arbiter can first ver-
ify credentials on the taint sets of packets before performing
service decisions using the set. To prevent eavesdroppers
from guessing the credential taint (perhaps by collating taint
sets of many packets), the credential generator changes the
credential taint in some fashion.
7. Prototype Implementation

















Figure 6: Architecture of the user-space Pedigree prototype. System
calls that propagate tags are intercepted using a pre-loaded shared li-
brary, and the tag information of all active resources is stored in a cen-
tral database.
Pedigree. Our prototype is geared towards testing the per-
formance and overhead of Pedigree and to serve as a proof
of concept; it does not attempt to be immune to malicious
attacks. Section 7.1 presents an overview of the prototype,
Section 7.2 describes the tag processor, Section 7.3 describes
tag database structure.
7.1 Overview
We implemented a proof-of-conceptprototype of Pedigree
in user-space in approximately 10,000 lines of C code with
2890 semicolons; we chose a user-space implementation for
ease of prototyping and testing.
Our prototype causes system calls made by applications
(e.g., read(2), write(2), fork(2), execve(2),
send(2), recv(2), etc.) to be interecepted by a pre-
loaded shared library, using which we track and record the
propagation of tags between resources. The shared library
also attaches tags of a process to the packets it generates,
and strips tags from packets the process reads and incorpo-
rates them into the process’s own tag.
7.2 Processing Tags
Figure 6 presents the architecture of our prototype. Be-
cause the prototype runs in user space, the tagger must be
notified whenever a system call that might propagate taints
is invoked. One way to implement this functionality is to
augment the kernel system call handler to notify the tag-
tracking process whenever such a system call occurs, but this
technique requires two user-kernel crossings, which are ex-
pensive. Instead, we use the functionality offered by the dy-
namic linker on Unix-like OSes (e.g., ld-linux.so in Linux)
to pre-load additional shared libraries before programs are
run (called “library interposing”), using the LD PRELOAD
environment variable.6
The interposed shared library wraps all system calls that
propagate taints according to the rules specified in Sec-
6Our implementation does not protect against malicious programs that an-
ticipate pre-loaded libraries and unset the LD PRELOAD variable. Strictly
speaking, there is no way to completely avoid “help” from the kernel in
tracking system calls: even if we resorted to building the tag-tracking func-
tionality into libc itself, a malicious program is free to link against its own
copy of libc.
tion 4.1.2. When a process invokes one of the wrapped sys-
tem calls, the code in the shared library sends a message
to a special process, the Tag processor with details of the
calling and called resource (e.g., in Figure 6, when process
P1 reads file F1, the library informs the Tag Processor of
the read, including the process ID of the process and the
inode number of the file). For some system calls, the inter-
posed library may also expect a response from Tag Proces-
sor: for e.g., during a send(2) call, packets must be
affixed with the tags of the process that invoked send(2)
before they are sent out to the network. At a high-level, the
Tag Processor offers two functions: 1) update (dst,
src): updates the tags of resource dst with those of
src; this operation is performed during read, write or
execve; 2) retrieve (src, &tag): retrieves the
tag of the resource src into the structure tag, which is per-
formed during send(2). A variant of update is invoked
when a network packet is received using recv(2): instead
of using a resource ID as src, the library uses the tag stripped
from an incoming network packet.
7.3 Tag Database
The tag processor uses a tag database to maintain the tags
of all active resources in the system. The database is imple-
mented as a two-level hierarchy consisting of an in-memory
cache backed by an on-disk database. The on-disk database
structure is maintained as two separate GDBM [8] databases,
one for files (i.e., permanent resources), and one for pro-
cesses (transient resources). The files are indexed by the ID
of the resource (i.e., inode number for files and process ID
for processes). Because process IDs are not related to to the
application being run as the process, the database for pro-
cesses does not have any permanent entries; the entry for a
process is deleted after the process dies, and the whole file is
cleared at system boot. The database for files, on the other
hand, persists across reboots.
The in-memory cache is used to reduce the I/O overhead
associated with accessing the on-disk database. The number
of tags cached is a configurable parameter. In case of cache
overflow, an LRU scheme is used to write through with the
on-disk database. When the system halts/reboots, cached
tags for files are transferred to the file database, while those
of processes are purged. The tag processor communicates
with the interposed library of a process making a syscall us-
ing POSIX message queues. Message queues automatically
handle issues of concurrency due to multiple processes writ-
ing to it.
8. Performance Evaluation
This section presents the evaluation of our prototype of
Pedigree implemented in user-space using library interpo-
sition. We evaluated the prototype on a 2.4GHz dual core
machine running a POSIX-based GNU/Linux system with
Linux kernel 2.6.22 and glibc version 2.6. We study the la-
tency overhead of the prototype when interposing both lo-

















Figure 7: Latency overhead. Interceptor msg time indicates the time
taken by system call interceptor to enqueue a message. Tag processing
time is the time taken by tag processor to process one message.
send, recv), in order to demonstrate the feasibility of
Pedigree on general purpose computers.
Latency Overhead. To evaluate intra-host system call over-
head, we created two test applications — test-read and test-
write — that perform 10,000 read(2) and write(2)
system calls in a loop on an open file descriptor. To evalu-
ate network overhead, we created a client/server file-transfer
application to upload a 67MB file from client to server over
a 1Gbps switched LAN, with both client and server using a
4096-byte buffer for sending or receiving data. We assume
that tags of the client and server do not change for the du-
ration of the file upload experiment, which is typically the
case with most processes performing network data transfers.
Figure 7 depicts the latency overhead calculated for these
test programs with and without library interposition. Note
that Process syscall time does not include the Tag pro-
cessing time as the tag messages are asynchronous (except
retrieve). The latency overhead for wrapped syscalls
is usually low, ranging from 1.5 to 4.5 times that of the
native syscall, which is reasonable for a user-space imple-
mentation; an in-kernel implementation is likely to be sev-
eral times faster. For send(2), the Interceptor msg time
exceeds that for other syscalls because retrieve(src,
&tag) is synchronous, i.e., it must wait for the tag proces-
sor to reply with the retrieved taint.
Message Queue Overflow. We noticed that the tag pro-
cessor processes incoming messages slower than application
processes enqueue them, resulting in the POSIX message
queue becoming full. A full queue causes an application
process attempting to enqueue messages to block (i.e., the
process is moved to the operating system scheduler’s wait
queue), leading to higher observed latency for the applica-
tion process. Because blocking misrepresents the real over-
head of the prototype, we performed measurements using
a message queue large enough to not overflow during the
course of the experiment.
Assuming an arbitrarily large message queue is, however,




























Sleep time between successive reads (µsec)
Wrapped read(2)
Native read(2)
Figure 8: Experiment to measure message queue overhead in Pedigree
prototype. The sleep time between successive read(2) is varied and the
wall-clock time seen by wrapped and native test-read is measured.
nel memory and their size is thus limited by physical mem-
ory. On the other hand, if the application process enqueues
messages at a latency comparable to the rate at which the
Tag processor processes them, even a small message queue
would suffice for IPC. The test programs in our evaluation
invoke system calls as fast as the operating system and hard-
ware can field them without performing any processing on
the data, while a real application would presumably process
data before performing syscalls on the data.
To evaluate the impact of blocking on perceived appli-
cation latency, we repeat the 10,000 loop read(2) using
test-read with a smaller message queue of merely 100 mes-
sages. To simulate processing, we add a small delay after
each read using the usleep(3) library routine. Figure 8
plots the time perceived by the test-read application as the
delay is varied from 0 µsec to 500 µsec.
The latency experienced by native test-read begins at 0.05
seconds and increases linearly with delay, but the latency
for wrapped test-read remains the same at 2.5 seconds from
0 µsec through 240 µsec. The reason for wrapped test-read
not reacting to the explicit delay is because the the sleep time
overlaps with the blocking time: wrapped test-read spends
approximately 240 µsec per cycle on the scheduler’s wait
queue, and any delay below 240 µsec does not affect its
overall wall-clock time. Beyond delays of 240 µsec, both
wrapped and native test-read show linear increase in wall-
clock time, with the difference between the two (approxi-
mately 0.09 seconds, or approximately 180% of native test-
read) reflecting the actual overhead of library interposition.
The blocking latency of 240 µsec per read is compara-
ble to (or less than) the processing time for many typical
operations (e.g., a graphical application takes milliseconds
to redraw the screen; a file transfer application sending data
from disk at 1 Mbps using a 4096 byte read buffer performs
a read only once every 4 milliseconds), making even the
overhead of our prototype (with small message queues) fea-
sible for real applications 7 Implementing the tagger using
shared memory will not involve message queue overhead,
while an in-kernel implementation will completely eliminate
the need for IPC.
9. Discussion
7The 240 µsec figure is the average blocking time between successive en-
queues for the message queue across all processes, which may imply higher
delays per process if many processes simultaneously perform syscalls in
quick succession.
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This section discusses some additional benefits that Pedi-
gree provides, as well as various limitations.
9.1 Benefits
Better anomaly detection. Pedigree focuses only on tag-
ging traffic, which we consider to be distinct from the well-
studied area of labeling traffic (i.e., as in traffic classification
and anomaly detection systems) [14, 16, 10]. We believe that
these systems could be much more powerful if the traffic it-
self carried taint sets indicating relationships among traffic
coming from different groups of hosts. For example, the
taint set might help an anomaly detection system realize that
a group of flows were related because the sources had all
communicated with one another, traffic flows coming from
a group of hosts were all generated by a process that was
running a common binary file, or that the traffic generated
by some group of processes that were running with a certain
level of trust.
Stronger host security. Administrators may want to track
files and processes that may have affected any given process.
Using Pedigree’s tags, system administrators can implement
host-based more expressive security rules than they can to-
day. An administrator who knows the taints corresponding
to a certain malicious application can construct a host-based
rule that prevents any process whose traffic carries the ma-
licious application’s taints from accessing critical resources,
irrespective of the process’ privilege level.
9.2 Concerns and Limitations
Connectionless protocols and route changes. Sending the
hash of the tag to reduce packet overhead (as described in
Section 5.1) will not work if either (1) the protocol is connec-
tionless or (2) the route from the sender to receiver changes
in the middle of a connection. It also imposes significant
overheads on short connections. The taint set is large, but
Pedigree’s container ID is small and can be used indepen-
dently of the taint set; applications that were sensitive to this
overhead could mark packets with only the container ID and
still gain some of the benefits of Pedigree. To combat route
changes, arbiters that receive unrecognized hashes of tags
could send a challenge (e.g., via an ICMP message) to the
sender asking the sender to re-send the original tag.
Taint accumulation. A potential application of Pedigree is
tracking worm outbreaks. Unfortunately, using the container
ID (specifically, the AppID) will likely be infeasible for this
purpose because most malware is polymorphic (i.e., each
copy of the binary takes a slightly different form). When
a worm creates a slight variant of a copy of itself, however,
the taint set for the new copy of the worm will contain the
taint set of the old worm, which may make tracking easier.
Additionally, Pedigree’s tagger could be augmented with a
special function that copies a hash of the old binary’s image
into the new binary’s taint set in cases where an application
creates a file that is similar to its own image.
Many applications, particularly those that maintain per-
sistent state in configuration files across sessions, may ac-
quire a very large number of taints over time. As such a taint
set fills up, performing certain types of operations, such as
tracking malware, become difficult: if such an application
writes malware to disk, the malware will acquire all of the
taints of that application. We believe the best defense against
this is to mandate that taint sets do not become too full using
the techniques we described in Section 5.3.
Issues with partial deployment. As discussed in Section 6,
when traffic that is carrying tags is passed through a host that
has not been instrumented with a tagger, the traffic’s “audit
trail” is lost. In these cases, a common worm outbreak (or
communicating group of hosts) might appear to an arbiter or
network monitor as distinct groups of hosts. Examining the
taint sets of each of the subgroups, however, might allow an
operator to recognize that taint sets from each group either
share many taints in common. In our future work, we plan
to study various methods for recovering taint sets in cases of
partial deployment.
10. Related Work
Resource interaction tracking. Pedigree is inspired by
ideas related to tracking interactions between resources at
the host level. Many research operating systems have at-
tempted to secure the system against exploits or to prevent
security breaches (e.g., exfiltration). Early research goes
back many decades (e.g., the Hydra operating system [4]),
and researchers continue to tackle related problems (e.g.,
Taos [30], and more recently, HiStar [37]). TaintCheck [20]
also monitors information flow, albeit at the instruction level,
in order to detect potential exploit code.
Access tracking systems such as Tripwire [27] perform in-
teraction tracking and detection; in contrast, Pedigree leaves
classification decisions to a separate arbiter. Perhaps the
closest work to Pedigree’s resource tracking scheme is “pro-
cess coloring” [12], where the authors propose tracking in-
teractions between resources ( “color diffusion”). Their
work, however, uses interaction tracking for early detection
of resources on a host that possess “colors” of a vulnerable
process, (much like Pedigree can be used to strengthen host
security as discussed in Section 9); Pedigree is unique in ex-
tending resource tracking across hosts using taint sets.
Traffic classification. Pedigree is primarily a traffic classifi-
ciation system, and attempts to address some of the concerns
that similar systems address: (1) application identification
agnostic to IP or port using systems such as BLINC [14],
or using statistical techniques [19]; (2) identifying session
structure in traffic [13], etc. In contrast to these systems,
Pedigree does not use network-level characteristics to iden-
tify applications, but instead relies on the trusted tagger on
hosts to record and transmit the tags of processes generat-
ing packets. However, Pedigree’s clustering scheme (Sec-
tion 5.4) can use the hints that these systems provide in order
to tune the input to the clustering algorithm (i.e., cluster the
taint sets only of unknown applications).
Tracking worm outbreaks and intrusions. Tracing the
origin of worm outbreaks can help identify miscreants. Ran-
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dom moonwalks [35] is representative of this body of work;
the authors use random walks to traverse edges of the graphs
constructed from traffic logs backwards in time in order to
identify the origin and propagation of worms. Many systems
such as BackTracker [15] use dependency graphs to back-
track attacks. In Pedigree, explicit backtracking or tracing
worm origins is not possible because a tag’s taint set can-
not enumerate the taints that were inserted into it; however,
an arbiter that sees a wide range of traffic can extract the
minimal taint sets using clustering (Section 5.4) to identify
groups of related hosts.
11. Conclusion
We presented Pedigree, a system for expressive,
semantically-rich traffic classification. Pedigree relies on
the cooperation of trusted taggers on end-hosts to affix tags
to network packets. Tags extend the provenance informa-
tion that already exists within a host to the network. These
tags may comprise fixed identifiers of the end-host, the ap-
plication generating packets, the credentials of the process
generating packets, and the taint set indicating the process’s
history (i.e., information about other processes, files, or re-
mote hosts that may have affected the process), These tags
can then be used by network elements (arbiters) for a va-
riety of applications, including: access control and authen-
tication, provisioning, preventing exfiltration, and tasks for
reducing unwanted traffic such as filtering, rate-limiting, or
dropping. Pedigree lets network operators use the same tag
structure for both upgrading and downgrading service, blur-
ring what we see as an artificial distinction between “on-
by-default” and “off-by-default” network capability design
paradigms. Our evaluation of a user-space prototype of Pedi-
gree shows that packet and storage overhead is negligible for
all but short connections.
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